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Mr  Chairman,  Ladies  and  Gentlemen 
Let  me  begin  by  saying  how  pleased  I  am  to  have 
this  oppertunity  of  speaking  to  you.  It  is  a 
pleasure  to  be  here  in  Chicago,  the  heart  of  the 
midwest,  and  to  have  this  possibility  of  exchanging 
views  and  ideas  with  its  business  leaders.  Given  the 
subject  of  my  remarks  today,  I  would  add  that  it is 
a  particular  pleasure  - and  I  hope  an  inspiration  -
to  be  at  or  near  the  geographical  center  of  the 
world's  most  successful  experiment  in  economic  and 
monetary  union. 
For  the  great  effort  which  is  now  under  way  in 
Europe  is  directed  towards  the  eventual  achievement 
of  a  union  on  a  scale  and  with  a  coherence  to  match 
your  American  achievement.  At  the  moment  we  are 
engaged  on  what  may  be  regarded  as  a  preliminary  step 
towards  the  achievement  of  that  union  and  it is  about 
the  details  of  that  step  that  I  wish  to  talk  today. 
But  before  I  become  immersed  in  the  technical (. 
details  I  should  saythat  the  European  Monetary 
System,  which  is  now  the  subject  of  deep  and 
sometimes  difficult discussion  between  our  member 
states,  and  which  will,  I  hope,  be  agreed  on  at 
the  meeting  of  the  European  Council  in  two  weeks 
time,  is  but  a  preliminary  step  to  the 
establishment  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  in 
Europe. 
This  union  - E.M.U.  as  it is  known  - has  had  a 
rather  troubled  history.  Indeed  quite  recently 
there  were  those  who  claimed  that  it was  an  idea 
whose  time  had  gone.  Some  claimed  that 
11 EMU"  had 
suffered  the  fate  of  the  Australian  bird  of  the 
same  name  which  is  now  unhappily  extinct.  Since 
the  economic  crisis  of  1973  Europeans  have  been 
increasingly  aware  of  the  divergencies  between 
their countries  rather  than  the  similarities:  it 
was  undeniable  that  the  disparity  between  the 
strongest  and  the  weakest  regions  of  the 
Community  was  growing,  and  that  in  that  context 
orthodox  economic  thinkers  tended  to  suppose 
that  the  dream  of  economic  and  monetary  union 
would  have  to  be  set  aside  for  this  generation. 
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It  was  in  this  cold  climate  that  the  Commission, 
meeting  at  La  Roche  in  the  Ardennes,  nevertheless 
decided  a  year  ago  to  revive~the aspiration  towards 
E.M.U.  It argued  that  because  the  Community  was 
losing  cohesion  under  the  stress  of  economic 
difficulties,  it had  become  all  the  more  necessary 
to  take  a  courageous  initative  instead  of  awaiting 
the  verdict  of  events.  The  virtual  disappearance 
of  the  Bretton  Woods  system  which  had  followed  the 
dollar  crisis  of  August  1971  and  the  rise  and  fall 
of  the  Smithsonian  system,  abandoned  for  a  system 
of  floating  exchagne  rates  by  the  end  of  1973,  made 
the  creation  of  a  successor  system  all  the  more 
pressing. 
The  President  of  the  Commission,  Roy  Jenkins,  in  a 
major  speech  at  Florence  urged  that,  precisely 
because  the  Community  had  lost  the  props  which  had 
made  possible  the  progress  of  the  'sixties,  a 
"qualitative  leap  forward''  was  called  for,  if needs 
be  in  the  face  ofserious  difficulties.  He  proposed 
.~  l 
..  ,  ~; that  European  leaders  should  make  a  political 
choice  in  favour  of  economic  and  monetary  union, 
regardless  of  how  discouraging  the  objective 
economic  indicators  might  be. 
It  would  not  be  true  to  say  that  this  revival 
4. 
of  E.M.U.  was  greeted  everywhere  with  aclaim.  Indeed 
in  the  early  stages  the  sceptics  probably  outnumbered 
the  enthuasts.  But  in  the  space  of  a  few  months  the 
idea  made  its  way  in  the  most  important  circles, 
namely  in  the  Economic  Councils  of  the  member  state 
governments,  and  in  particular  in  the  thinking  of  the 
French  and  German  leaders.  It  is  true  that  largely 
unforeseen  circumstances,  external  in  their  nature, 
tended  to  concentrate  their  minds  in  the  direction 
proposed  by  the  Commission.  In  particular  the  steady 
decline  of  the  dollarforced  the  strong  currency 
countries  in  Europe  to  look  for  a  new  line  of  security. 
It  is  also  true  that  the  scheme  which  en~ages  our 
attention  now  is  but  a  step  towards  the  economic  and 
monetary  union  which  the  Commission  put  forward.  But 
it would  not  be  right,  at  the  outset  of  a  discussion 
of  the  limited  system  of  monetary  intregration  which 
is  now  at  hand,  to  understate  the  importance  of  the 
imaginative  political  contributionmade  by  the 
President  of  the  European  Commission. The  great  aim  of  E.M.U.  is  to  create  a  single 
monetary  system  which  will  operate  throughout 
the  nine  member  states  of  our  European 
Community,  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  dollar 
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does  throughout  the  United  States.  Some  five  months 
ago,  in  the  German  city  of  Bremen,  those  nine 
countries  agreed  to  establish  a  common  monetary 
system  and  to  bring  it  into  operation  by  the 
beginning  of  the  new  year.  This  system  will  be 
a  crucial  step  towards  the  achievement  of  a  full 
European  economic  Union. 
One  can  view  the  European  Monetary  System  - E.M.S. 
as  it has  come  to  be  called- in  isolation,  as  a 
mere  mechanical  framework  designed  to  create  a 
zone  of  exchange  rate  stability,  and  to  helpto 
bring  about  a  greater  convergence  of  economic 
policies  in  the  member  states.  To  do  so  would,  I 
believe,  greatly  understate  the  real  naturo  of  those 
proposals. ·-
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Let  us  revert  once  ~ore  to  the  historical  background 
against  which  the  idea  evolved.  The  orig~nal 
proposal  for  establishing  the  European  Economic 
and  Monetary  Union  were  made  at  the  Hague  some  nine 
years  ago.  They  envisaged  its  establishment  in  three 
distinct  phases.  The  first  of  these  involved  the 
coordination  of  short  term  economic  and  budgetary 
policies  amongst  the  six  countries  who  formed  the 
Community  at  the  time.  (Ireland,  Denmark  and  Great 
Britain  did  not,  of  course,  join  the  Community  until 
1973,  and  were  therefore  not  eligible  to  participate 
in  the  experiment  mooetd  in  1969). 
To  this  initial  action  of  coordination  there  was 
added;  suggestion  of  preliminary  harmonisation  of 
corporate  and  personal  taxation  - otherwise  a 
single  currency  Europe  with  free  capital  movement 
would  become  a  series  of  competing  tax  havens. 
This  first  phase  was  to  have  been  followed  by  a 
period  in  which  economic  policies,  both  short  and 
medium  term,  would  be  formulated  jointly.  At  the 
same  time,  capital  movements  would  be  freed 
and  tight  exchange  rate  margins  maintained. The  fj.J~ ··  ~  stage was  to ,see  the  creation  of  an  EEC 
Central  Bank  and  Reserve  Fund,  free  capital movement 
and  the  removal  of tax  frontie~s. 
As  happens  so often  we  became wiser after the event. 
A  number  of events which  could not have  been  foreseen 
combined to make  the  achievement  of this ambitious 
programme  much  more  difficult than  could have  been 
imagined.  Prehaps  the  single most  important  development 
was  the  energy crisis of  1973  and  the  recession which 
followed  it.The political will needed  to carry out 
what were  in  fact  far  reaching  changes  in national 
policies was  absent,  in  the  face  of adverse  economic 
circumstances.  There were  other weaknesses  too.  The 
huge  number  of consultative bodies necessitated by 
the  proposal  as  originally formulated  created  a 
burden quite out  of proportion to the  results that 
their meetings  produced.  Differing rates of  inflation 
and  differing reactions to the  existance of  high 
inflation made  the  coordination,  and particularly 
the  convergence  of economic policies difficult in 
the  short  ttt:rm.  So  too did differing rates  of  growth 
in productivity.  Budgetary pressures  at national  level, 
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a  reflection of  a  parlous  economic equilibrium,  had restricted the  scope  of the necessary coordinaltion,  and 
indeed the  size of the  necessary financial 
instruements  so  that the  resource transfers between 
the member  states  could not meet  the  reqiurements 
posited by the  the programme. 
But  despite  the  disappointing experience,  the  idea 
remained attractive.  Fundementally of course  the 
strength of that attraction derives  from  a  deep-seated 
feeling  amongst  European  statesmen  that such  a  step 
would be  a  catalyst,  an  impetus  to  the political 
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union  of our nine  countries.  For it is clearthat the merging 
of our economies  in  this fashion  implies  a  centralisation 
of economic  and  financial policy makingin  the  central 
institutions with  a  concommittantly  far-reaching 
reinforcement  of those  institutions.  In  time,  responsibility 
for macro-economic  policy,  for external economic  relations 
and  for  that essential element of  an  equitable union,  I 
mean  the  management  of resource  transfers between  the 
stronger and  the we,:ker  regions,  woul  pass  to the 
central  institutions. Quite  clearly by  reducing what  I  might  call the 
bureaucratic  segmentation  of the  European  continent 
this process would  allow  for  a  much  more  effective 
employment of our  eqonomic  resources,  with  consequent 
gains  in productivity,  trading strength  and  living 
standards.  It is not surprising then  that as  we 
recovered  from  the  economic  setbacks of the mid  70s 
European  leaders were  determined not  to be 
discouraged by  the difficulties  encountered but to 
rather see  in  them  a  challange to be  overcome. 
When  therefore,  the  idea of economic  and monetary 
union  was  revived the question posed was  not whether 
we  should  seek it but rather which  of three possible 
approaches  to  the attainment of the  union  seemed  to 
hold  the most promise. 
The  three alternatives were  roughly  as  follows  :  we 
could  continue the policy of small  steps  forward, 
recalling that  a  good  deal  of what had already been 
achieved despite  the  adverse  circumstances of  the  70s 
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in  terms  of the  abolition of tariffs and  the  establishment 
of free  movement  for  labour  and  capital  •.  We  could  seek by 
means  of a  great leap  forward  an  early monetary 
intregration.  Or  we  could  decide  to defer the  attempt 
at intregration until  a  much  greater degree  of  market unity had been  achieved. 
The  outcome  of the  Bremen meeting  last June  was  a 
compromise  embodying  elements  of all three 
possibilities.  It was  a  decision th set up  a  European 
Monetary  System. 
The  proposals made  at Bremen  were  of great  importance. 
They were  to  study ways  of stabilising currencies  in 
Europe  by creating  a  system of strict exchange 
relationships,  the  establishment of a  well  endowed 
pool  of reserves  and  the  creation of  a  reserve 
currency based  on  the  European  unit of account.  It was 
recognised that if the errors of the  original initative 
were  to be  avoided,  if in fact  the  the weaker  countries 
were  to be  able  to stay in the  system,  politically 
acceptable ways  of br:inging  inflation rates  into line 
would have  to be  found  and means  of strengthening the 
weaker economies  would be  necessary. 
It is accepted that if the  system  is  to work  smoothly 
and  to be  durable,  not  to  say  credible,  it is necessary 
11.. to ensure that  inflation rates which  now  range 
between  slightly over  11.5 percent  in  Italy to 
a  little more  than  2  percent  in  Germany  should 
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converge without  at the  same  time  generating through that 
convergence  unacceptably deflationary  e~fects.  The  cure 
must not,  one  might  say,  be  lethal to the patient. 
Such  a  convergence  of inflation rates at a  moderate 
level  is the best way  of ensuring stable exchange  rates 
and  a  balance of payments  equilibrium.  This  objective 
should be  an  intregral part of  a  wider strategy which 
includes  other  important  social  and  economic  aiffis  such 
as,  in particular,  sustained growth gradually leading to full 
employment,  a  convergence  of living standards,  and  the  reduction 
of regional  imbalances.  These  are  desirable  aims  which will 
not be  achieved without sustained effort and  careful planning. 
To  ensure  the  sucess of the  Bremen  strategy and  in order to 
allow all member  states to participate,  the necessary 
institutional contitions to obtain  convergence  in policies 
need to be  promoted.  In particular,  monetary policies must 
come  together gradually with  the  system's stability in  view 
and budgetary and monetary policies must  be brought  towards 
mutual  consistency with  intregration  in  a  short-term 
and  in  a  medium-term  context and  should be  directed IN  Th~  CONT~XT OF  SUCH  CO~C~RT~D ACTIONS1  ADJUSTME~T POLICY  -
1 NCLUDll'JG1  WHi:.N  N.6C£SSAHY 1  ADJUSTi"ii;NTS  IN  t:XCHANG.t:..  RATe.S 
WILL  hA V£  TO  H6  J:!AS£0  ON  A  SYN1'1i:.TRY  rli:. TW.E.EN  T.HE  RIGHTS 
AND  OBLIGATIONS  OF  THE  PART I C  I PAtllT S •  r HIS. S  Yi"'Ji'lE TRY  i-1G.ANS  THAT 
Di:.FICIT  COUNTRIES  SHOULD  PURSUE  A  POLICY  TO  H~STORi:.  dASIC 
i:.QUILIBrUUl'"l  AND  TO  R~DUC.C.  INFLATION  RAT.r:.Su  IN  PARALLi:.L1  IN 
Th.C.  SURPLUS  COUNTRIES  THi:.RE  SHOULD  B~ AN  EXPANSION  OF  INT~RNAL 
Di!:iv'JAND~  WITHOUT  THIS  HAVING  ANY  INFLATIONARY  E.FFl:.CTS•  THi:. 
SITUATION  OF  BOTH  SURPLUS  AND  DEFICIT  COUNTRI~S ~OULO BE 
~XAMINED AT  COMMUNITY  LEVEL  WITH  A  VIEW  TO  ASSESSING  POSSIBLi:. 
ivlEASURi:.S  TO  BE  TAKEN  AS  AND  WHEN  THE  SYSTi.M  IS  TTHREAT.E.NJ:.;D 
'W  I TH  IMBALANCE • 
ACHIEVING  THE  DESIRED  CONVERGENCE.  OF  i:.CONOMIC  POLICIES  WILL 
Ml:.Z::T  CERTAIN  DIFFICULTIES  GIVi:.N  THE  VARYING  UW1PORTANCE  THAT 
THE  OBJECTIVES  OF  GROWTH  AND  .E.MPLOYMENT  ASSUME  IN  THE  VARIOUS 
MEMBER  STATES  AS  A  CONSEQUENCE  OF  THEIR  DIFFERENT  LEVELS  OF 
DEVELOPMENT  AND  UNEMPLOYMENT• 
IN  PART I CULAR1  THE  LESS  PROSPEROUS  t".l,t:;i'1BER  COUNTRIES  -
HOWEVER  ENERGETIC  AND  WELL  DESIGNED  THEIR  ~FFORTS MIGHT  BE  -
WILL  FACE1  BOTH  TRANSITIONAL  PROBLl:.MS  AS  Trl~Y ADJUST  TO  TH.E. 
D I FFi.RENT  EXCHANGE  RATE  REG H1.E  OF  THE.  .i::.i"iS  AND  LONG.i::.R  TERM 
DIFFICULTIES  IN  RECONCILING  CONTINUED  STABL~ PARTICIPATION 
IN  THE  SYSTEM  WITH  PURSUIT  OF  THEIR  GROWTH1  INCOME  AND 
EMPLOYMENT  GOALS•  BUT  THE  FUTURE  MUST  LOOK  AFTER  ITS.i::.LF• 
THE  TRANSITIONAL  PROBLEMS  ARE  OF  t'10Rl::  I1'1t'1EDIATE  CONCt:RN  ANU 
I  WOULD  SAY  THAT  THE  FOLLOWING  FACTORS  ARE  PARTICULARLY 
R~LEVANT TO  THE  POSITION  OF  THE  LESS  PROSP~ROUS MEMBER 
COUNTRII:;S  : 
FIRST1  TH£.  POSSIBILITY  THAT  TH~ .dALANCi.  OF  PAYMENTS  WOULD 
B.i:.CONE  A  i'IORE  IMPORTANT  CONCERN  OF  i.CONONIC  POLICY1  TO  TH.i:. 
DE.TRli'i~NT  OF  OTHER  OBJECTIV.I:.S1  PARTICULARLY  GROWTH  AND 
J::; MPLOYM.ENT  CREATION: 
S~COND1  THE  FACT  THAT  PARTICIPATION  IN  THE  EMS  ON  A  STABLE 
BASIS  IMPLIES  LESS  FLEXIBILITY  IN  EXCHANGE  RATES1  AND  THUS1 
IN  THE  ABSENCE  OF  OFFSETTING  l'"li!..A.SURES~  REDUCES  THE 
POTENTIAL  OF  ECONOr·tJIC  POLICY  INSTRUMi.NTS  WHILE  LEAVING 
UNCHANGED  THE  NUMBER  OF  POLICY  OBJ.i::.CTIV~S: 
THIRD1  THE  POSSIBILITY  THAT  EMS  WOULD  LEAD  TO  FASTER 
CONVERGENCE  OF  FACTOR  PRICES  <LABOUR  AND  CAPITAL>  THAN  OF 
PRODUCTIVITY  LEVELS1  WITH  CONSEQUENTIAL  GENERATION  OF 
FORCES  TENDING  TO  DRAW  CAPITAL  AND  LABOUR  FROM  THE  LESS 
PROSPEROUS  MEMBER  COUNTRIES: FOURTH,  THe  PROBABILITY  OF  A  LAG  IN  TH~ ADJUSTMeNT  OF 
EXPECTATIONS  (E.G·  ON  wAGE  RISES>  TO  THE  ASSUMED  LOWER 
INFLATION  RATE  WHICH  ~OULD FOLLO~  FROM  PARTICIPATION  IN 
THE  EMS  AND  THE  DIFFICULTI~S THIS  WOULD  CAUS~ FOR  ECONOMIC 
POLICY• 
THERE  IS  MORE  THAN  THE  NORi'lAL  UNCERTAINTY  ABOUT  ECONOMIC 
FORECASTING  INVOLV£D  IN  THIS  CAUTIOUS  RESPONSE•  FOR  THE 
IMPACT  OF  TH~ NEW  SYSTEM  ON  TH~ EXCHANGES  WILL  BE  TO  A 
GREAT  eXTENT  DETERMINED  BY  ITS  TECHNICAL  STRUCTURE,  AND  IN 
PARTICULAR  BY  WHETHER  WE  ARE  TO  HAVE  THE  BASKED  SYSTEM  OR 
THE  SO-CALLED  PARITY  GRID  SYSTEM·  AND  THAT  DECISION  HAS  YET 
TO  BE  MADE· 
STRATEGICALLY,  HOWEVER,  I  HAVE  NO  DOUBT  THAT  A  STRENGTHENING 
OF  THE  EUROPEAN  CURRENCIES  WITH  ITS  CONSEQUENT  DEMPENING  OF 
THE  TURBULENCE  OF  THE  EXCHANGE  MARKETS  CANNOT  BUT  BE 
BENE.FICIAL  TO  THE  DOLLAR·  ONE  DOES  NOT  HAVE  TO  UNDERLINE  TODAY 
THE  DESTABLISHING  EFFECTS  OF  MONETARY  SPECULATION  ON  INVESTMENT 
AND  TRADING  CONDITIONS.  OUR  SYSTEM,  1  BELIEVE,  WILL  DISCOURAGE 
THAT  SPECULATION,  EVEN  IF  IT  CANNOT  ALTOGETHER  ABOLISH  IT• 
I  WOULD  GO  FURTEHR  IND~ED IN  SUGGESTING  THAT  THE  US  HAS 
EVERY  INTEREST  IN  ENCOURAGING  THE  EMERGENCE  OF  AN 
ECONOMICALLY  STRONG  AND  OUT~ARD•LOOKING COMMUNITY•  A 
PROSPEROUS  NON-PROTECTIONIST  EUROPE  OFFERS  A  MARKET  OF 
SOME  250  MILLION  CONSUMERS  FOR  AMERICAN  PRODUCTS  AND  YOUR 
MARKETING  CAN  ONLY  B.C.  SIMPLIFIED  WH~N IT  IS  CONDUCTED  IN  A 
UNIFIED  AND  STABL~  MON~TARY SYST£M. 
I  D•:>  NOT  D.t::;NY  THAT  FROt"..  DAY  TO  DAY  THE  US  AND  TH~  COl'1t'1UNITY 
MAY  BE  IN  SHARP  DISAGrli:.i.l'1.li.NT  ABOUT  OiiJE  POINT  OR  ANOTHER  OF 
ECON0t1!C  OR  FINANCIAL  POLICY·  I  DO  NOT  PRi.TJ:.;ND  THAT  W.C.  ARE 
NOT  IN  lvJANY  INSTANCO::S  C0~"1P.C.TIT0RS•  BUT  I  8-C;LIEV~  YOU  WILL 
ACCJ:.PT  THAT  IT  HAS  ALWAYS  B.C.:EN  IN  TH~ LONG  T.C.RM  INT£REST  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  TO  BE  ABL~ TO  DEPEND  ON  TH~ PARTNERSHIP  OF  A 
STRONG  AND  STABLE  EUROP~,  ANO  IN  THAT  ~PIRIT  I  AM  CONFIDENT 
THAT  THIS  BOLD  ADVANCE  TOWARDS  MONETARY  COHESION  AND  EVENTUAL 
ECONOMIC  UNION  CAN  ONLY  HE  TO  THE  HISTORIC  BEN~FIT OF 
BOTH  CONTINENTS· 
I  AM  SURE  I  DO  NOT  HAV.t:.  TO  LABOUR.  THi.  TH£M£  AT  A  i"lt:.li:T ING 
OF  THi.  BELGIAN-At"'i.RICAN  CHAr1B.i:::R  OF  TH£  CHICAGO  ASSOCIATION, 
HOWEVi.R  SCEPTICAL  MY  R£CEPTION  MIGHT  BE  IN  A  MORE  PURJ:.LY 
NATIVE  FORUM,  SO  I  CONCLUDED  HER£  IN  THANKING  YOU  MOST 
WARMLY  FOR  THE  KINDNESS,  HOSPITALITY  AND  ATTENTION  WHICH 
YOU  HAVE  SHOWN  M£• 